Existence of a Radner equilibrium in a model with transaction costs by Weston, Kim
ar
X
iv
:1
70
2.
01
70
6v
2 
 [q
-fi
n.M
F]
  2
3 F
eb
 20
18
Existence of a Radner equilibrium in a model with transaction costs
Kim Weston1
Rutgers University
Department of Mathematics
Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA
September 18, 2018
Abstract
We prove the existence of a Radner equilibrium in a model with proportional trans-
action costs on an infinite time horizon and analyze the effect of transaction costs on
the endogenously determined interest rate. Two agents receive exogenous, unspanned
income and choose between consumption and investing into an annuity. After estab-
lishing the existence of a discrete-time equilibrium, we show that the discrete-time
equilibrium converges to a continuous-time equilibrium model. The continuous-time
equilibrium provides an explicit formula for the equilibrium interest rate in terms of
the transaction cost parameter. We analyze the impact of transaction costs on the
equilibrium interest rate and welfare levels.
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1 Introduction
We study an incomplete Radner equilibrium with proportional transaction costs. Trans-
action costs influence asset prices, yet most asset pricing models with transaction costs
take some or all asset prices as given. We seek to answer two questions:
(1) Does a finite-agent equilibrium with transaction costs and an endogenously deter-
mined interest rate exist?
(2) If an equilibrium exists, what is the effect of transaction costs on the interest rate
and welfare levels?
We devise a model to answer these questions and reveal an unexpected effect from
transaction costs on the endogenous asset prices. Depending on agent risk preferences
and consumption smoothing over time, a proportional transaction cost can increase or
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decrease equilibrium interest rates. We provide an explicit formula for the continuous-
time equilibrium interest rate in terms of the transaction costs and other input param-
eters. We find that welfare decreases with increases in the transaction costs.
Proving the existence of a general equilibrium is a challenging problem on its own,
and frictions exacerbate the difficulties. Existing work on equilibria with transaction
costs lacks the ability to endogenously derive asset prices while providing rigorous
justification in a finite-agent Radner equilibrium. The works [22], [18], and [8] rely
on an exogenously specified bank account, while [18] and [2] provide numerics but
no existence result. Models with a continuum of agents are introduced in [23], [22],
and [12]. An approximate equilibrium concept is introduced in [11]. In contrast to the
existing literature, we introduce transaction costs into a finite-agent Radner equilibrium
with unspanned income and consumption over an infinite time horizon. This set-up is
longstanding without transaction costs; see, for instance, [3] and [24]. We prove the
existence of a proportional transaction cost Radner equilibrium and analyze its effects
on endogenous asset prices.
In our model, two exponential investors receive unspanned income, consume, and
trade in an annuity market on an infinite time horizon. The individual agent’s optimal
investment problem in the presence of proportional transaction costs is well-studied
and dates back to [19] and [9]. The equilibrium setting in [23] is most similar to ours:
In [23], a continuum of agents trade in two annuities in an overlapping generations
equilibrium while one of the annuities faces real proportional transaction costs from
trading. However, [23] assume that the zero transaction cost economy supports an
equilibrium in which the agents’ wealth first increases then decreases. We make no
such assumption, and our model does not exhibit this behavior. We provide an example
of an equilibrium with proportional transaction costs, which derives all traded asset
prices endogenously and analytically describes the effect of transaction costs on the
equilibrium interest rate.
Understanding the effects of transaction costs analytically is often not possible. In
[13], [20], and [16], the authors derive a Taylor expansion for the single-agent value
function and no-trade boundaries for small transaction costs. In equilibrium, we seek
to understand the effect of transaction costs on the agents’ behavior and equilibrium
interest rate. The closeness of the agents’ input parameters determine explicitly when
the agents are motivated to trade in equilibrium. We also derive an explicit formula
for the interest rate in terms of the transaction costs in continuous time. For agents
i = 1, 2, we let αi > 0 be agent i’s risk aversion, βi > 0 be the time-preference parameter
for consumption, µi be agent i’s income stream’s drift, and σi be the volatility of the
(unspanned) Brownian component in agent i’s income stream. We let λ ∈ [0, 1) be
the proportional transaction cost parameter. Then in an equilibrium in which agent
1 chooses to buy and agent 2 chooses to sell, the equilibrium interest rate is given
explicitly by
r(λ) =
β˜1/α1 + β˜2/α2
1
α1(1+λ)
+ 1α2(1−λ)
.
The relationship between the agents’ risk aversions determine whether equilibrium
interest rates will increase or decrease when transaction costs are introduced. Our
model shows that typically the presence of transaction costs will decrease the equi-
librium interest rate. However, when one agent seeks to trade aggressively in order
to ensure her future consumption while the other agent trades timidly and consumes
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more readily, then it is possible for small transaction costs to increase the equilibrium
interest rate. In this case, the agents balance each other in their consumption timing
and risk appetites so that a premium is placed on the annuity’s future consumption
stream when transaction costs are introduced. Our model is admittedly stylized, yet it
captures the equilibrium interest rate and trading behavior with transaction costs in a
long-standing, classical setting.
We employ a shadow price approach to establish an equilibrium in order to gain
tractability of the single-agent problems. Shadow prices represent the traded asset
price in a least-favorable frictionless market completion, where the optimal investment
and consumption strategies align between the frictionless shadow market and the trans-
action cost market. Shadow prices for proportional transaction costs were introduced
by [14] and [6] and have since been established in increasingly greater generality; see,
for example, [15] and [7]. Because least-favorability is investor specific, each economic
agent will select her own frictionless shadow market to perform utility maximization.
We link the investor-specific shadow markets using a “closeness” condition in equilib-
rium. We show that a unique equilibrium asset price is only guaranteed when a trade
occurs. Otherwise, agents’ shadow prices allow for a range of prices consistent with
the equilibrium.
Several components of this equilibrium example are crucial for obtaining our results.
We rely on the agents’ exponential preferences and income processes with independent
increments for tractability of the single-agent problem similar to [24], [4], and [17]. In
a frictionless model with deterministic interest rates, an annuity is spanned by a bank
account, and vice versa. With transaction costs, we cannot freely move between an
annuity and the bank account as the traded security. We work with the annuity as the
traded security similar to [12] and [23]. This choice yields trading strategies in which
the agents choose to do the same thing at every time point: either buy, sell, or trade
nothing. Theorem 5.2 proves that the constant interest rate equilibrium obtained by
trading in the annuity is not possible when the bank account is the traded security.
This model is indeed highly stylized, yet it provides the first existence proof of a finite-
agent Radner equilibrium with proportional transaction costs in which all traded asset
prices are derived endogenously.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the discrete-time equilibrium
and proves its existence in Theorem 2.4. Section 3 considers a continuous-time equi-
librium model. The existence of an equilibrium is established in Theorem 3.4, and it is
shown to be the limit of discrete-time equilibria. We analyze the impact of transaction
costs on interest rates and welfare in Section 4. Section 5 discusses a transaction cost
equilibrium with a traded bank account. The proofs are contained in Section 6.
2 Discrete-Time Equilibrium
We consider a discrete-time infinite time horizon Radner equilibrium without a risky
asset. There is a single consumption good, which we take to be the numeraire. Time
is divided into intervals [tn, tn+1), n ≥ 0, where tn := n∆ and ∆ > 0. An annuity,
denoted by A, is in one-net supply and is available to trade with an exogenously
specified proportional transaction cost λ ∈ [0, 1). One share in the annuity delivers
consumption units at a rate of one per unit time over all future time intervals. Thus, a
share in the annuity will deliver ∆ consumption units over each time interval [tn, tn+1).
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The risk-free rate r > 0 will be determined endogenously in equilibrium using the
equilibrium annuity values. We will focus on equilibria allowing for constant, positive
interest rates even though our definition of equilibrium does not exclude general interest
rates. The annuity dynamics are given by
Atn+1 −Atn = (Atnr − 1)∆, A0 > 0.
In this case, the annuity value will be the constant Atn = A = 1/r. We choose to study
a model with a traded annuity rather than a bank account because the annuity will
provide the mathematical structure needed to establish an equilibrium with transaction
costs. We discuss the implications of a traded bank account in Section 5.
Each agent has the exogenous income stream Yi = (Yitn)n≥0 given by,
Yitn+1 = Yitn + µi∆+
√
∆σiZitn+1 , Yi0 ∈ R,
where µi ∈ R, σi > 0, and Zitn+1 ∼ N (0, 1) for i = 1, 2. The random variables (Zitn)n≥1
are independent, and Z1· and Z2· are possibly correlated. The agents are also endowed
with an initial allocation of annuity shares θi0 ∈ R such that θ10 + θ20 = 1.
The flow of information in this economy is given by F = (Ftn)n≥0, where Ftn =
σ(Zit1 , · · · , Zitn : i = 1, 2). All processes are assumed to be adapted to F, and all
agents share the same filtration and probability P. All equalities are assumed to hold
P-almost surely.
2.1 Individual Agent Problems
Rather than deal directly with an optimization problem in a market with frictions,
we cast each individual investor’s problem as a problem in her own frictionless shadow
market. In equilibrium, the agents’ shadow markets will be related, and a unique (non-
shadow) equilibrium price for the traded annuity will exist when a trade occurs. Yet
the individual optimization problems are treated in isolation as frictionless. Therefore,
only in the next section (Section 2.2) will the parameter λ appear.
We first consider the single-agent investment and consumption problem for agent
i ∈ {1, 2}. At time tn ≥ 0, agent i chooses to consume ctn units of the consumption
good and invest θtn shares in the annuity beginning with an initial allocation of θ0.
We consider equilibria for which the value of the shadow annuity and shadow interest
rate (to be determined endogenously in equilibrium) are constants Aitn = Ai = 1/ri
and ri > 0, respectively.
For a given investment strategy θ, agent i’s shadow wealth is defined by
Xitn := θtnAitn ,
with the self-financing condition
(θtn+1 − θtn)Aitn+1 = (Yitn − ctn + θtn)∆, n ≥ 0. (2.1)
For a given consumption and investment strategy (c, θ), the wealth evolves as
Xcitn+1 −Xcitn =
(
Xcitnri + Yitn − ctn
)
∆, Xi0 = θ0Ai0.
Given a consumption strategy c and an initial share allocation θ0, the self-financing
condition dictates the investment strategy θ.
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We consider agents with exponential preferences over running consumption; that is,
agent i’s utility function is c 7→ −e−αic for αi > 0. The agents prefer consumption now
to consumption later, which is measured by their time-preference parameters βi > 0.
For i = 1, 2, t ≥ 0, and c ∈ R, we define Ui(t, c) := −e−βit−αic.
Definition 2.1. A consumption strategy c is called admissible for agent i if c satisfies
the transversality requirement
E
[
exp
(−βitn − αiriXctn − αiYtn)] −→ 0 as n→∞.
In this case, we write c ∈ A∆i .
The value function is defined by
V ∆i (x, y) := sup
c∈A∆i
∞∑
n=0
E [Ui(tn, ctn)] , x, y ∈ R. (2.2)
It is possible to consider non-constant shadow interest rates in the individual agent
formulation, however it comes at the cost of not being able to explicitly describe the
individual agents’ transversality conditions. We refer the reader to Chapter 9 Section
D of [10] for further details. Our constant shadow interest rate formulation allows
us to explicitly characterize the optimal consumption and wealth processes, which we
summarize in Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.2. Agent i’s optimal consumption and wealth process in (2.2) are given
by
cˆitn = riXˆitn + Yitn +
1
αiri∆
(
β˜i∆− log(1 + ri∆)
)
(2.3)
and
Xˆitn =
θi0
ri
+
tn
αiri
(
1
∆
log (1 + ri∆)− β˜i
)
, (2.4)
where β˜i := βi + αiµi − α
2
i σ
2
i
2 . Moreoever, the value function can be expressed in the
form
V ∆i (x, y) = J
∆
i (x, y) := −
1
ri∆
(1 + ri∆)
1+ 1
ri∆ exp
(
−αirix− αiy − β˜i
ri
)
.
2.2 Equilibrium
The definition of equilibrium must allow us to relate both agents’ willingness to trade,
even when no trade occurs due to frictions. Shadow prices provide us with this mecha-
nism and a way to compute the range of annuity values consistent with an equilibrium.
Typically, shadow prices are used as a tool to establish properties of an original model
with frictions; see, for example, [15] and [7]. Here, we work with shadow prices di-
rectly, and we subsequently determine transaction cost models consistent with our
agents’ shadow markets.
Definition 2.3. For the transaction cost parameter λ ∈ [0, 1), an equilibrium with
transaction costs is given by a collection of processes (Ai, cˆi, θˆi)i=1,2 such that
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(i) Real and financial markets clear for each n ≥ 0:
2∑
i=1
cˆitn∆ = ∆+
2∑
i=1
Yitn∆− 2λ
∣∣∣θˆ1tn+1 − θˆ1tn∣∣∣Atn+1 and θˆ1tn + θˆ2tn = 1,
where in the event of a trade, we define Atn+1 :=
Aitn+1
1+λ if agent i ∈ {1, 2}
purchases a positive number of annuity shares; that is, θitn+1 − θitn > 0.
(ii) For each agent i = 1, 2, the consumption and investment strategies, cˆi and θˆi with
θˆi0 = θi0, are optimal with the shadow annuity price Ai:
V ∆i (θi0Ai0, Yi0) =
∞∑
n=0
E [Ui(tn, cˆitn)] .
(iii) The shadow markets remain “close enough” to the underlying transaction cost
market in the following sense: For each n ≥ 0,
A1tn
A2tn
∈
[
1− λ
1 + λ
,
1 + λ
1− λ
]
.
Moreover, for n ≥ 1, if θˆ1tn− θˆ1tn−1 > 0 then A1tn = A2tn · 1+λ1−λ . If θˆ1tn− θˆ1tn−1 < 0
then A1tn = A2tn · 1−λ1+λ .
Remark 2.1 (On Definition 2.3 (iii)). Let us consider a single-agent optimization prob-
lem for a risky asset with frictions S and a shadow price S˜. The shadow price along with
the optimal trading strategy θˆ will satisfy S˜tn ∈ [(1−λ)Stn , (1+λ)Stn ], S˜tn = (1−λ)Stn
when θˆtn − θˆtn−1 < 0, and S˜tn = (1 + λ)Stn when θˆtn − θˆtn−1 > 0. Condition (iii) in
Definition 2.3 enforces this relationship between both agents’ shadow markets and the
underlying market. In the absence of condition (iii) and when trade does not occur,
there is no connection between the shadow annuity markets and the underlying mar-
ket. In this case, there are infinitely many no-trade equilibria, even in the frictionless
(λ = 0) case.
Since each agent optimizes in her own shadow market while maintaining the “close-
ness” condition (iii), a unique market annuity rate is only guaranteed when trade
occurs. When trade does not occur in a given period, there is a range of possible annu-
ity values (and corresponding interest rates) consistent with equilibrium. In [18, 11],
the authors have a single equilibrium price rather than two shadow prices, but these
works need to allow for the agents to pay different transaction costs based on a total ex-
ogenous cost. We are able to avoid this endogenous splitting of costs while maintaining
tractability in part because we choose to work with shadow markets.
The following is the main result of the section. The proof is in Section 6.
Theorem 2.4. Let β˜i := βi + αiµi − α
2
i σ
2
i
2 , and assume that β˜i is strictly positive
for i = 1, 2. For λ ∈ [0, 1), there exists an equilibrium with strictly positive constant
shadow interest rates r1, r2 and constant shadow annuity values A1 = 1/r1, A2 = 1/r2.
The optimal consumption and wealth processes for investor i = 1, 2, are given by (2.3)
and (2.4), respectively.
Case 1: A no-trade equilibrium occurs if
eβ˜2∆ − 1
eβ˜1∆ − 1
∈
[
1− λ
1 + λ
,
1 + λ
1− λ
]
. (2.5)
6
In this case,
r1 =
eβ˜1∆ − 1
∆
and r2 =
eβ˜2∆ − 1
∆
.
The range of possible constant, non-shadow interest rates that are consistent with this
equilibrium is given by r = (rtn)n≥0 with
rtn ∈
[
1− λ
∆
(
emax(β˜1,β˜2)∆ − 1
)
,
1 + λ
∆
(
emin(β˜1,β˜2)∆ − 1
)]
6= ∅.
Case 2: There exists an equilibrium in which agent 1 will purchase shares of the
annuity in equilibrium at all times tn ≥ 0 (while agent 2 sells shares) if
eβ˜2∆ − 1
eβ˜1∆ − 1
>
1 + λ
1− λ, (2.6)
where the interest rate r > 0 is uniquely determined by
(
1 +
r∆
1− λ
) 1
α2∆
(
1 +
r∆
1 + λ
) 1
α1∆
= e
β˜1
α1
+
β˜2
α2 , (2.7)
and the shadow interest rates are given in terms of
r = r1(1 + λ) = r2(1− λ).
The parameters β˜1 and β˜2 represent the agents’ time preference parameters for con-
sumption adjusted for risk and income. Strictly positive β˜i parameters correspond to
an economy that allows for strictly positive equilibrium shadow interest rates. Strictly
positive shadow interest rates, in turn, ensure that the shadow annuity values are
well-defined. Allowing even one of the β˜i parameters to cross zero would cause the cor-
responding shadow annuity to be infinitely valued. Financially, this case corresponds
to the case when a (zero transaction cost) shadow annuity with a constant interest rate
cannot be replicated by a bank account because of the bank account’s dwindling value.
When the agents’ parameters β˜1 and β˜2 are sufficiently close, as in (2.5), then
the agents are not motivated to trade because of the relatively high transaction costs.
Trading occurs in equilibrium only when the parameters β˜1 and β˜2 are sufficiently far
apart to overcome the transaction costs. In this case, the agents’ strategies are very
simple: either buy or sell the exact same amount at every time period.
Remark 2.2. If the inequality (2.6) is flipped so that
eβ˜1∆ − 1
eβ˜2∆ − 1 >
1 + λ
1− λ,
then we can conclude an analogous result in which the roles of agent 1 and 2 are
interchanged.
3 Continuous-Time Equilibrium
In our simple setting, the presence of only one traded security with constant dividends
allows for an optimal continuous-time trading strategy that is absolutely continuous
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with respect to the Lebesgue measure (dt), even though Brownian noise enters the
economy through the income streams. Since consumption occurs on the dt-time scale,
the absolute continuity property will allow transaction costs to be paid on the same
dt-time scale in the real goods market.
In this section, we consider the continuous-time infinite time horizon Radner equi-
librium. The only traded security is an annuity A, which is in one-net supply and
available to trade with the proportional transaction cost rate λ ∈ [0, 1). The risk-free
rate r > 0 will be determined endogenously in equilibrium using the equilibrium annu-
ity values. We again focus on equilibria allowing for constant, positive interest rates,
in which case, the annuity value will be the constant A = 1/r.
Each of the two agents has an exogenous income stream given by Yi = (Yit)t,
i = 1, 2, with dynamics
dYit = µidt+ σidBit, Yi0 ∈ R,
where µi ∈ R, σi > 0, and B1 and B2 are possibly correlated Brownian motions. The
agents are also endowed with an initial allocation of shares in the annuity θi0 ∈ R such
that θ10 + θ20 = 1.
The flow of information in the economy is given by F = (Ft)t≥0, where Ft =
σ(B1u, B2u : 0 ≤ u ≤ t). All process are assumed to be adapted to F, and all agents
share the same filtration.
3.1 Individual Agent Problems
We consider the single agent investment and consumption problem for agent i’s shadow
market, i ∈ {1, 2}. We focus on models where the value of the shadow annuity and
shadow interest rate (to be determined endogenously in equilibrium) are constants
Ait = Ai = 1/ri and ri > 0, respectively.
For a given investment strategy θ, agent i’s shadow wealth is defined byXit := θtAit.
For a measurable, adapted consumption process c = (ct)t for which
∫ T
0 |ct|dt < ∞ P-
almost surely for all T > 0, the shadow wealth process associated with c evolves like
dXcit = (X
c
itri − ct + Yit) dt, Xci0 = θi0/ri ∈ R.
As in the discrete-time case, we consider agents with exponential preferences over
running consumption with risk aversion αi > 0 and time-preference parameter βi > 0.
Definition 3.1. Let i ∈ {1, 2}. A consumption process c = (ct)t is called admissible
for agent i if the transversality condition holds:
lim
t→∞
E
[
e−βit−αiriX
c
t−αiYit
]
= 0.
In this case, we write c ∈ Ai.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, agent i’s value function is given by
Vi(x, y) := sup
c∈Ai
E
∫ ∞
0
Ui(t, ct)dt, x, y ∈ R.
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We show in Theorem 3.2 (below) that Vi = Ji, where
Ji(x, y) = − 1
ri
exp
(
−αirix− αiy + 1− β˜i
ri
)
. (3.1)
We note that V ∆i (x, y)∆ −→ Ji(x, y) as ∆ → 0, where V ∆i is the discrete-time value
function defined by (2.2).
The following result establishes the individual agent optimal investment strategies.
The proof is omitted, as it does not vary substantially from the discrete-time case.
Theorem 3.2. For i = 1, 2, let β˜i := βi+αiµi− α
2
i σ
2
i
2 . The optimal consumption policy
and wealth process for agent i are given by
cˆit = riXˆit + Yit +
β˜i
riαi
− 1
αi
, (3.2)
Xˆit = X
cˆi
t =
θi0
ri
+
1
αi
(
1− β˜i
ri
)
t. (3.3)
Moreoever, the value function coincides with (3.1); that is, Vi = Ji.
3.2 Equilibrium in Continuous-Time
In addition to establishing the existence of an equilibrium, we are interested in how
the equilibrium interest rate depends on λ.
Definition 3.3. For the transaction cost parameter λ ∈ [0, 1), an equilibrium with
transaction costs is given by a collection of processes (Ai, cˆi, θˆi)i=1,2 such that
(i) For i = 1, 2, the optimal investment strategy θˆi is differentiable in time with
derivative θˆ′it.
(ii) Real and financial markets clear for all t ≥ 0:
2∑
i=1
cˆit = 1 +
2∑
i=1
Yit − 2λ
∣∣∣θˆ′1t∣∣∣At and θˆ1t + θˆ2t = 1,
where in the event of a trade, we define At :=
Ait
1+λ if agent i ∈ {1, 2} purchases a
positive number of annuity shares; i.e., θˆ′it > 0.
(iii) For each agent i = 1, 2, the consumption and investment strategies, cˆi and θˆi with
θˆi0 = θi0, are optimal with the annuity price Ai:
Vi(θi0Ai0, Yi0) =
∫ ∞
0
E [Ui(t, cˆit)] dt.
(iv) The shadow markets remain “close enough” to the underlying transaction cost
market in the following sense: For all t ≥ 0,
A1t
A2t
∈
[
1− λ
1 + λ
,
1 + λ
1− λ
]
.
Moreover, if θˆ′1t > 0 then A1t = A2t · 1+λ1−λ . If θˆ′1t < 0 then A1t = A2t · 1−λ1+λ .
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Remark 3.1. When trade occurs, we are able to define At :=
Ait
1+λ , where agent i ∈ {1, 2}
purchases a positive number of shares, θˆ′it > 0. In this case, if we consider constant
interest rate equilibria, then the equilibrium interest rate is uniquely determined by
r = 1/A = 1/At.
The following result establishes an equilibrium for the continuous-time model. The
proof is omitted, as it mirrors the proof of Theorem 2.4.
Theorem 3.4. Let β˜i := βi + αiµi − α
2
i σ
2
i
2 , and assume that β˜i is strictly positive
for i = 1, 2. For λ ∈ [0, 1), there exists an equilibrium with strictly positive constant
shadow interest rates r1, r2 and constant shadow annuity values A1 = 1/r1, A2 = 1/r2.
The optimal consumption policies and wealth processes are given by (3.2) and (3.3),
respectively.
Case 1: A no-trade equilibrium occurs if
β˜2
β˜1
∈
[
1− λ
1 + λ
,
1 + λ
1− λ
]
. (3.4)
In this case, r1 = β˜1 and r2 = β˜2. The range of possible (non-shadow) interest rates that
are consistent with this equilibrium is r = (rt)t≥0 where rt ∈ [(1− λ)max(β˜1, β˜2), (1 +
λ)min(β˜1, β˜2)] 6= ∅.
Case 2: There exists an equilibrium in which agent 1 will purchase shares of the
annuity in equilibrium at all times t ≥ 0 (while agent 2 sells shares) if
β˜2
β˜1
>
1 + λ
1− λ. (3.5)
In this case, the interest rate r > 0 is determined by
r =
β˜1/α1 + β˜2/α2
1
α1(1+λ)
+ 1α2(1−λ)
. (3.6)
The shadow interest rates are given by r = (1 + λ)r1 = (1− λ)r2.
The agents behave similarly in a continuous-time equilibrium as in discrete time.
When the agents’ income-adjusted time preference parameters β˜1 and β˜2 are sufficiently
close, as in (3.4), then the agents are not motivated to trade because of the relatively
high transaction costs. Their shadow interest rates reflect their individual frictionless
view of the market and do not differ significantly enough to encourage trade.
Trading occurs in equilibrium only when the parameters β˜1 and β˜2 are sufficiently
far apart to overcome the transaction costs. In (3.5), agent 1 values the annuity more
(with a lower shadow interest rate) than agent 2, which encourages her to acquire
shares in the annuity. The agents’ strategies are very simple: either buy or sell at the
same rate for all times.
Theorem 3.5 proves that the discrete-time interest rate passes to the continuous-
time equilibrium rate as the time step ∆ tends to zero.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that
β˜2
β˜1
>
1 + λ
1− λ.
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Let r(∆) be the solution to (2.7) corresponding to the time step ∆ > 0, and let r(0)
be the continuous-time equilibrium interest rate given by (3.6). Then r(∆) > 0 is the
unique interest rate among constant interest rate equilibria for sufficiently small ∆,
and r(∆) −→ r(0) as ∆→ 0.
Remark 3.2. When β˜1
β˜2
> 1+λ1−λ , we can conclude analogous results to Theorem 3.4 Case
2 and Theorem 3.5 in which the roles of agent 1 and 2 are interchanged. An analogous
result to Corollary 4.1 holds for β˜1 > β˜2 > 0.
4 Effects of Transaction Costs
In this section, we analyze the effects of transaction costs on the equilibrium interest
rate and agent welfare. Our method of solving for an equilibrium is the same for
zero and non-zero transaction costs, which allows us to easily compare the endogenous
interest rate as λ varies. The simplicity of the continuous-time limiting model lends
itself to further study as the transaction costs tend to zero. Even in this stylized model,
the equilibrium interest rate is impacted by frictions in a non-trivial way and is not
always monotonic.
Zero transaction costs and traded randomness from the stochastic income streams
lead to complete markets and Pareto optimal equilibrium allocations. In our model,
there is no market for the risk associated with the agents’ stochastic income streams.
Consequently, the equilibrium allocation is non-Pareto optimal, even when transaction
costs are zero. In Section 4.3 below, we use certainty equivalents to compare the welfare
loss due to transaction costs and unspanned income in equilibrium, similar to [8]. Both
types of incompleteness lead to a welfare loss.
4.1 Interest Rate Effects
For i = 1, 2, we recall that the risk- and income-adjusted time preference parameters
are given by β˜i := βi + αiµi − α
2
i σ
2
i
2 . When β˜1 and β˜2 differ and are strictly positive,
then Theorem 3.4 establishes the existence of a continuous-time equilibrium in which
trade will occur for sufficiently small transaction costs. We define a transaction cost
threshold λˆ ∈ R by
λˆ :=
(√
α2 −√α1
)2
α2 − α1 .
Corollary 4.1 describes the behavior of the equilibrium interest rate in the case when
trade occurs. The proof is contained in Section 6.
Corollary 4.1 (The Effects of Small Transaction Costs). Suppose that β˜2 > β˜1 >
0. For λ ∈ [0, β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
), the equilibrium interest rate exists, is unique among constant
interest rate equilibria, and has the explicit form given by
r = r(λ) =
β˜1/α1 + β˜2/α2
1
α1(1+λ)
+ 1α2(1−λ)
.
The transaction cost threshold λˆ is strictly positive when α1 < α2. In this case, r is
strictly increasing on
(
0,min
(
β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
, λˆ
))
and strictly decreasing on
(
min
(
β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
, λˆ
)
, β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
)
.
The equilibrium interest rate r is strictly decreasing when α1 ≥ α2, in which case λˆ ≤ 0.
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The impact of transaction costs on the equilibrium interest rate depends on the
configuration of agent risk aversions αi and risk- and income-adjusted time preference
parameters β˜i. An agent with a large β˜i is a planner: For small enough transaction
costs, she will choose to forgo consumption now in order to invest in shares of the
annuity to ensure a future consumption stream. An agent with a small β˜i is a consumer:
For small enough transaction costs, she will sell annuity shares in order to consume
today, even though she will miss out on the future dividend stream.
In addition to the adjusted time preference parameters, the agents’ risk aversion
levels determine the effect of transaction costs on the equilibrium interest rate and
welfare levels. Table 4.2 below outlines the four possible agent configurations that
assist in defining two equilibrium regimes.
Table 4.2.
small risk large risk
aversion, αi > 0 aversion, αi > 0
small adjusted Aggressive Planner Reserved Planner
time preferences, invests in the annuity invests in the annuity
β˜i > 0 prefers future consumption prefers future consumption
most risk seeking most risk averse
large adjusted Aggressive Consumer Reserved Consumer
time preferences, sells the annuity sells the annuity
β˜i > 0 prefers consumption today prefers consumption today
most risk seeking most risk averse
In the following analysis, we consider the configuration of agent parameters from
Corollary 4.1 in which β˜2 > β˜1 > 0 so that agent 1 buys while agent 2 sells for suf-
ficiently small transaction costs. By investing in shares of the annuity, agent 1 plans
for the future by sacrificing her consumption goods today for the annuity’s guaranteed
dividend streams later. Agent 2 seeks to consume now. He sells shares in the annuity in
order to earn immediate consumption units from the sale while forgoing the annuity’s
future dividend stream. We consider two configurations of the agents’ risk aversions in
order to determine the impact of transaction costs on the interest rate and welfare.
Case 1: α1 ≥ α2. The configuration β˜2 > β˜1 > 0 and α1 > α2 > 0 corresponds
to a reserved planner (agent 1) and aggressive consumer (agent 2) economy. Agent
1 is more reserved in terms of her risk aversion and time preferences, while agent 2’s
more cavalier attitude prods him to take on additional risk in order to consume more
now. As frictions are introduced into the economy, the agents’ contrasting risk and
time preferences translate into a lower premium placed on the equilibrium interest rate.
Case 2: α1 < α2. The configuration β˜2 > β˜1 > 0 and α2 > α1 > 0 corresponds
to an aggressive planner (agent 1) and reserved consumer (agent 2) economy. The
equilibrium interest rate reflects the market’s compensation for future consumption.
A small level of friction (up to the level λˆ) benefits the aggressive planner as she is
compensated for her desire to invest in the annuity to ensure her future consumption.
Her modest appetite for risk is reflected by her risk aversion parameter α1, which is
dominated by α2 yet remains sufficiently small so that the agents are willing to trade
with β˜1 < β˜2.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium interest rate is plotted as a function of the transaction costs for λ
in the Case 2 trading range [0, β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
). The solid line plot represents Case 1 with a reserved
planner and aggressive consumer economy. The dashed line plots represent Case 2 with an
aggressive planner and reserved consumer economy.
When transaction costs become sufficiently large in that they go above the threshold
λˆ, then the aggressive planner no longer receives an additional interest rate premium
for her future planning. In this case, the interest rate decreases as transaction costs rise
above λˆ, and the reserved consumer begins to benefit from selling annuity shares in a
lower rate environment. In conclusion, for strictly positive but small transaction costs,
a preference for future consumption and moderate amount of risk can be beneficial if
the other agent is more risk averse and prefers immediate consumption. For λ > λˆ,
the interest rate premium declines.
Figure 1 plots the equilibrium interest rate as a function of transaction costs λ in the
range [0, β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
) for three different input parameterizations and both cases described
above. We assume that the agents in Figure 1 have identical income volatility σi = .01
and time preference parameters βi = .02, i = 1, 2; see [5]. Their risk aversions αi
vary between 2 and 8, while their income drift µi is between 0.02 and 0.1, i = 1, 2;
see, [1], [5] and [21]. The given parameter specifications allow for each agent to have
dominant risk aversion while still ensuring that the income-adjusted time preference
parameters are ordered by β˜2 > β˜1 > 0. Though the input parameters are in some sense
reasonable and the expression for the interest rate is explicit, the effects of transaction
costs on the equilibrium interest rate vary significantly amongst the parameterizations,
as illustrated in Figure 1.
4.2 Complete Market Equilibrium
Our model’s incompleteness stems from both the unspanned income streams and trans-
action costs. When transaction costs are zero, it is possible to complete the market
by introducing additional financial securities. In order to measure the welfare loss due
to incompleteness, we compare our market to one with the same aggregate demand
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and agent preferences, where the risks from trading are spanned in a dynamically
complete way by introducing risky financial assets. Since traded financial securities
span B1 and B2, we denote the correlation between B1 and B2 by ρ ∈ [−1, 1] so that
d 〈B1, B2〉t = ρdt.
For i = 1, 2, we recall that Ui(t, x) = −e−βit−αix. We consider a representative
agent with weight γ > 0, whose indirect utility for a given consumption stream c is
given by the sup-convolution,
Uγ(c) := sup
c1∈A1,c2∈A2:
∀t, c1t+c2t≤ct
E
[∫ ∞
0
(U1(t, c1t) + γU2(t, c2t)) dt
]
.
We define the representative risk aversion parameter αr > 0 and representative time
preference parameter βr by
αr :=
1
1/α1 + 1/α2
and βr :=
β1/α1 + β2/α2
1/α1 + 1/α2
.
A corresponding representative utility function is given by Uγ(t, x) = e−βrt−αrx. For
the aggregate demand, c = Y1 + Y2 + 1, we have that
Uγ(Y1 + Y2 + 1) = −E
[∫ ∞
0
Uγ(t, Y1t + Y2t + 1)dt
]
= −E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βrt−αr(Y1t+Y2t+1) · α1 + α2
α2
(
α1
α2γ
)− α1
α1+α2
dt
]
= −
α1+α2
α2
(
α1
α2γ
)− α1
α1+α2 e−αr(y1+y2+1)
βr + αr(µ1 + µ2)− α2r2 (σ21 + σ22 + 2ρσ1σ2)
,
and the corresponding optimal individual consumptions c1, c2 given in the sup-convolution
are
cγ1t =
α2
α1 + α2
(Y1t + Y2t + 1)− β1 − β2
α1 + α2
t+
1
α1 + α2
log
(
α1
γα2
)
,
cγ2t =
α1
α1 + α2
(Y1t + Y2t + 1) +
β1 − β2
α1 + α2
t− 1
α1 + α2
log
(
α1
γα2
)
.
The equilibrium state price density ξ = (ξt)t is described by the first-order condition
for the aggregate consumption by ξt =
Uγc (t,Y1t+Y2t+1)
Uγc (0,y1+y2+1)
, where Uγc denotes the derivative
in the consumption variable of Uγ . The dynamics of the state price density are given
by
dξt = −ξt(rcompt dt+ ν1tdB1t + ν2tdB2t), ξ0 = 1,
where rcomp is the equilibrium interest rate, and ν1 and ν2 are the market prices of
risk corresponding to the Brownian motions B1 and B2, respectively. The equilibrium
interest rate in the complete market is computed using the first-order condition and
ξ’s dynamics. It is given by
rcomp = βr + αr(µ1 + µ2)− α
2
r
2
(σ21 + σ
2
2 + 2ρσ1σ2).
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We note that ξ, rcomp, ν1, and ν2 are independent of the weighting superscript γ. Since
the agents’ preferences are described by exponential utility functions, these terms do
not depend in equilibrium on γ.
We are interested in the welfare level of a complete market economy and will use
the sum of the agents’ certainty equivalents as a proxy for welfare.
Definition 4.3. For i = 1, 2 and representative agent weight γ > 0, a value CEcompi
is called the certainty equivalent for agent i if∫ ∞
0
Ui (t, CE
comp
i ) dt = −
∫ ∞
0
Ui (t, c
γ
it) dt,
where cγi is agent i’s optimal consumption stream. We write CE
comp
i (γ) to emphasize
the dependence of the certainty equivalent on γ.
The certainty equivalent represents a constant consumption stream level that an
agent is willing to exchange for her optimal (stochastic) consumption stream. For
i ∈ {1, 2} and γ > 0, the certainty equivalent is given by
CEcompi (γ) =
1
αi
log
(
rcomp
βi
)
+ cγi0.
The sum of the certainty equivalents can be used as a welfare measure in the economy.
In the complete market equilibrium, for initial wealth stream values y1, y2 ∈ R and
representative agent weight γ > 0, we have
CEcomp1 (γ) +CE
comp
2 (γ) = 1 + y1 + y2 +
1
α1
log
(
rcomp
β1
)
+
1
α2
log
(
rcomp
β2
)
.
We note that the sum of the certainty equivalents does not depend on the weight γ > 0.
4.3 Welfare Loss from Transaction Costs
In this section, we compare the agents’ welfare loss due to transaction costs. Similar to
the approach in [8], we use the sum of the agents’ certainty equivalents as our measure
of welfare. We find that the introduction of transaction costs causes a strict loss of
welfare.
Our results contrast [8], which performs a related analysis in a one-period continuum-
of-agents model with heterogenous beliefs on a risky asset, an exogenous riskless asset,
and no income. [8] finds that under some parameter specifications, a strictly posi-
tive transaction cost can provide a welfare gain. Our results from Section 4.1 show
that it may be possible for the interest rate to increase for a strictly positive level of
transaction costs, yet the welfare itself cannot be recouped.
Definition 4.4. For i = 1, 2, λ ∈ [0, 1) and (x, y) ∈ R2, a value CEi is called the
certainty equivalent for agent i at transaction cost level λ, initial wealth x, and initial
income level y if ∫ ∞
0
Ui (t, CEi) dt = Vi(x, y).
We write CEi(λ) to emphasize the dependence of the certainty equivalent on λ.
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The certainty equivalent represents a constant consumption stream level that an
agent is willing to exchange for her optimal (stochastic) consumption stream. For a
given shadow interest rate ri > 0, the certainty equivalent can be expressed as
CEi =
1
αi
log
(
ri
βi
)
+ cˆi0,
where cˆi0 is the optimal consumption level at time 0 and is given in (3.2).
In equilibrium, we are interested in the sum of our agents’ certainty equivalents as
a proxy for the welfare of the economy. For β˜2 > β˜1 > 0,
CE1(λ) + CE2(λ) =


1 + y1 + y2 +
1
α1
(
log
(
r(λ)
β1(1+λ)
)
+ β˜1(1+λ)r(λ) − 1
)
+ 1α2
(
log
(
r(λ)
β2(1−λ)
)
+ β˜2(1−λ)r(λ) − 1
)
, if λ < β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
,
1 + y1 + y2 +
1
α1
log
(
β˜1
β1
)
+ 1α2 log
(
β˜2
β2
)
, if λ ≥ β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
.
The following result states that the economy’s welfare is decreasing in incompleteness
due to transaction costs and unspanned income. The proof of Proposition 4.5 is given
in Section 6.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that β˜2 > β˜1 > 0. CE1(λ) + CE2(λ) is strictly decreasing
on [0, β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
) and constant on [ β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
, 1]. Moreoever, complete market welfare levels
dominate incomplete market welfare levels in that for all transaction costs λ ∈ [0, 1]
and weights γ > 0, we have CE1(λ) + CE2(λ) < CE
comp
1 (γ) + CE
comp
2 (γ).
Figure 2 plots the economy’s welfare change due to incompleteness as a function of
transaction costs λ for the three input parameterizations that were used in Figure 1.
We assume that the income stream correlation is zero in that 〈B1, B2〉t = 0 as in [5].
The given parameter specifications allow for each agent to have dominant risk aversion
while still ensuring that the income-adjusted time preference parameters are ordered
by β˜2 > β˜1 > 0. Regardless of the input parameterizations, the sum of the certainty
equivalents, CE1+CE2, is decreasing in the transaction costs. When no trading occurs,
the certainty equivalent sum is constant in transaction costs. The economy’s welfare
always decreases when moving from a complete to incomplete market. Though the
interest rate is possibly non-monotone in the transaction cost level as in Figure 1, the
welfare in the economy only decreases.
5 The Bank Account as the Traded Security
Transaction costs in our model prevent us from trading freely between the annuity and
a bank account. Using an annuity as our traded security allows for constant shadow
interest rates and trading strategies that are the same at every time point: either the
agents buy, sell, or trade nothing. The simple structure of transaction cost equilibria
with a traded annuity is not possible when the bank account is traded instead.
In this section, we consider a discrete-time equilibrium with transaction costs when
the bank account is the traded security. Theorem 5.2 proves that the traded bank
account model prevents a constant-interest rate transaction cost equilibrium.
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Figure 2: The welfare change due to incompleteness is plotted as a function of the transaction
costs. The solid line plot represents Case 1 with a reserved planner and aggressive consumer
economy. The dashed line plots represent Case 2 with an aggressive planner and reserved
consumer economy. The economy’s welfare is decreasing in both cases.
In contrast to the annuity, the bank account is a financial asset in zero-net supply.
For i = 1, 2, the shadow bank account Bi has the associated interest rate process
ri = (ritn)n≥0 and is given by Bi0 = 1 and
Bitn = (1 + ri0∆) · . . . · (1 + ritn−1∆), n ≥ 1.
We focus on equilibria yielding constant shadow interest rates ritn = ri, as in the traded
annuity case.
For a given investment strategy θ, agent i’s shadow wealth is given by Xitn :=
θtnBitn . Since the bank account is in zero-net supply, the self-financing condition in
(2.1) will be replaced by
(θtn+1 − θtn)Bitn+1 = (Yitn − ctn + θtn)∆, n ≥ 0.
Thus, for a given consumption and investment strategy (c, θ), the shadow wealth
evolves like
Xcitn+1 −Xcitn =
(
Xcitnri + Yitn − ctn
)
∆, Xi0 = θ0Bi0 = θ0.
The definitions of admissibility and the value function are unchanged from Defini-
tion 2.1 and (2.2). As such, Theorem 2.2 holds for the frictionless shadow market with
a bank account carrying a constant interest rate.
Definition 5.1. For the transaction cost parameter λ ∈ [0, 1), a transaction cost
equilibrium with a bank account is given by a collection of processes (ri, cˆi, θˆi)i=1,2 such
that
(i) Real and financial markets clear for each n ≥ 0:
2∑
i=1
cˆitn∆ =
2∑
i=1
Yitn∆− 2λ
∣∣∣θˆ1tn+1 − θˆ1tn∣∣∣Btn+1 and θˆ1tn + θˆ2tn = 0,
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where in the event of a trade, we define Btn+1 :=
Bitn+1
1+λ if agent i ∈ {1, 2}
purchases a positive number of annuity shares; that is, θitn+1 − θitn > 0.
(ii) For each agent i = 1, 2, the consumption and investment strategies, cˆi and θˆi with
θˆi0 = θi0, are optimal with the shadow bank account value Bi:
V ∆i (θi0) = −
∞∑
n=0
E
[
e−βitne−αi cˆitn
]
.
(iii) The shadow markets remain “close enough” to the underlying transaction cost
market in the following sense: For each n ≥ 1,
B1tn
B2tn
∈
[
1− λ
1 + λ
,
1 + λ
1− λ
]
.
Moreover, if θˆ1tn − θˆ1tn−1 > 0 then B1tn = B2tn · 1+λ1−λ . If θˆ1tn − θˆ1tn−1 < 0 then
B1tn = B2tn · 1−λ1+λ .
Theorem 5.2 shows that aside from a stylized special case, any transaction cost
equilibrium with a bank account must have non-constant interest rates. The proof is
presented in Section 6.
Theorem 5.2. Let β˜i := βi + αiµi − α
2
i σ
2
i
2 , and suppose that β˜i and λ are strictly
positive for i = 1, 2. Suppose that (ri, cˆi, θˆi)i=1,2 is a transaction cost equilibrium with
a bank account. If r1, r2 are strictly positive constants, then the following must hold:
(1) The agents’ parameters satisfy β˜1 = β˜2.
(2) No trading occurs in equilibrium: θˆitn − θˆitn−1 = 0 for i = 1, 2 and n ≥ 1.
(3) The shadow rates are identical and satisfy
r1 = r2 =
1
∆
(
eβ˜1∆ − 1
)
.
Though it is possible to consider stochastic interest rates in a transaction cost
equilibrium with a bank account using a system of variational inequalities, it is not
clear if such an equilibrium exists. The simple mathematical structure of the annuity
cannot be obtained by studying a traded bank account in its place. The annuity
provides a constant dividend stream at all possible consumption times, which allows
agents to receive constant future dividends without trading or incurring transaction
costs.
6 Proofs
We begin by proving Theorem 2.2 in the discrete-time case.
Proof. We check that cˆi is admissible, by noting that
E
[
exp
(
−βitn − αiriX cˆiitn − αiYitn
)]
= E
[
exp
(
−αiriXi0 − n log(1 + ri∆)− α
2
i σ
2
i
2
n∆− αi
n∑
k=1
√
∆σiZitk
)]
= (1 + ri∆)
−n exp (−αiriXi0) −→ 0 as n→∞.
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We have that c 7→ −e−αic + e−βi∆E
[
J
(
x(1 + ri∆) + y − c, y + µi∆+ σi
√
∆Z
)]
is
maximized for cˆ = cˆ(x, y) = rix + y +
β˜i
αiri
− 1αiri∆ log(1 + ri∆), where Z denotes a
standard normal random variable. Thus,{
−
n−1∑
k=0
e−αictn + e−βitnJ∆i
(
Xcitn , Yitn
)}
n≥0
is a supermartingale for all c ∈ A∆i and is a martingale for c = cˆi ∈ A∆i .
Therefore, for cˆi,
J(x, y) = −E
[
n∑
k=0
e−αi cˆitk
]
+ e−βitn+1E
[
J∆i
(
X cˆiitn+1 , Yitn+1
)]
= −E
[
∞∑
k=0
e−αi cˆitk
]
by the transversality condition,
which implies that J∆i ≤ V ∆i . Similarly, for any c ∈ A∆i ,
J(x, y) ≥ −E
[
n∑
k=0
e−αictk
]
+ e−βitn+1E
[
J∆i
(
Xcitn+1 , Yitn+1
)]
= −E
[
∞∑
k=0
e−αictk
]
by the transversality condition.
Thus, J∆i = V
∆
i , and cˆi ∈ A∆i is the optimal consumption policy. For initial wealth
x = θi0Ai = θi0/ri, the optimal wealth policy corresponding to cˆi is Xˆi = X
cˆi
i , and
Xˆitn =
θi0
ri
+
tn
αiri
(
1
∆
log (1 + ri∆)− β˜i
)
.
We now move towards the proof of Theorem 2.4. The self-financing condition (2.1)
with the optimal policies (2.2) and (2.3) imply(
Yitn − cˆitn + θˆitn
)
∆ =
(
θˆitn − θˆitn−1
)
Aitn =
1
αiri
(
log(1 + ri∆)− β˜i∆
)
. (6.1)
For i = 1, 2, we define
Fi(r) :=
1
αir
(
log (1 + r∆)− β˜i∆
)
, r > 0. (6.2)
Using Definition 2.3 part (i), we seek solutions r1, r2 > 0 such that
F1(r1)+F2(r2) = λ
( |F1(r1)|
1 + λ
+
|F2(r2)|
1− λ
)
1{F1(r1)≥0}+λ
( |F1(r1)|
1− λ +
|F2(r2)|
1 + λ
)
1{F1(r1)<0}.
By rewriting this equation and including Condition (iii) from Definition 2.3, we seek
r1, r2 > 0 such that
F2(r2) =
{
−1−λ1+λF1(r1), if F1(r1) ≥ 0,
−1+λ1−λF1(r1), if F1(r1) ≤ 0.
(6.3)
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and
r2
r1
=


1+λ
1−λ , if F1(r1) > 0,
1−λ
1+λ , if F1(r1) < 0,
∈
[
1−λ
1+λ ,
1+λ
1−λ
]
, if F1(r1) = 0,
(6.4)
Proposition 6.1. Let β˜i := βi+αiµi−α2i σ2i /2, and suppose that β˜i is strictly positive
for i = 1, 2. There exists a unique strictly positive solution pair r1, r2 to (6.3) and
(6.4).
Case 1: If e
β˜1∆−1
eβ˜2∆−1
∈
[
1−λ
1+λ ,
1+λ
1−λ
]
, then
r1 =
eβ˜1∆ − 1
∆
and r2 =
eβ˜2∆ − 1
∆
. (6.5)
Case 2: If we have e
β˜2∆−1
eβ˜1∆−1
> 1+λ1−λ , then the unique positive solutions satisfy
r1 ∈
(
eβ˜1∆ − 1
∆
,
1− λ
1 + λ
(
eβ˜2∆ − 1
∆
))
and r2 =
1 + λ
1− λr1.
Proof. We show the existence of the unique solution pair by examining both cases.
Suppose that
eβ˜1∆ − 1
eβ˜2∆ − 1
∈
[
1− λ
1 + λ
,
1 + λ
1− λ
]
.
Then r1 and r2 as in (6.5) is the unique solution to (6.3) and (6.4) such that F1(r1) =
F2(r2) = 0.
To show uniqueness, we proceed by contradiction. Assume for the sake of contra-
diction that there exist strictly positive solutions r1, r2 such that F1(r1) > 0. We have
that F1(r1) > 0 if an only if F2(r2) < 0, r1∆ > e
β˜1∆ − 1, and r2∆ < eβ˜2∆ − 1. Then
by (6.4),
eβ˜1∆ − 1
eβ˜2∆ − 1
<
r1
r2
=
1− λ
1 + λ
≤ e
β˜1∆ − 1
eβ˜2∆ − 1
,
which is a contradiction. Here, we have used that β˜1, β˜2 are strictly positive to ensure
that eβ˜i∆ − 1 > 0. The same argument applies to rule out the case when F1(r1) < 0
and F2(r2) > 0. Therefore, we must have that F1(r1) = F2(r2) = 0, in which case
r1 =
eβ˜1∆−1
∆ and r2 =
eβ˜2∆−1
∆ .
We now consider the existence of a solution in Case 2. For F1(r1) > 0, (6.3) and
(6.4) reduce to solving for r1 > 0 such that
(
1 + r1∆ · 1 + λ
1− λ
)1/α2
(1 + r1∆)
1/α1 = exp
((
β˜1
α1
+
β˜2
α2
)
∆
)
, (6.6)
while r2 =
1+λ
1−λ · r1. The assumption that β˜1, β˜2 are strictly positive ensures that the
right hand side of (6.6) is strictly bigger than 1. We note that x 7→
(
1 + x · 1+λ1−λ
)1/α2
(1 + x)1/α1
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strictly increases from 1 to∞ for x ∈ [0,∞). Thus, there exists a unique solution r1 > 0
to (6.6). Moreover, e
β˜2∆−1
eβ˜1∆−1
> 1+λ1−λ implies that
r1 ∈
(
eβ˜1∆ − 1
∆
,
1− λ
1 + λ
(
eβ˜2∆ − 1
∆
))
.
We show uniqueness for Case 2 by contrapositive, which will rule out the possibility
of finding solutions for which F1(r1) ≤ 0. Suppose that there exist strictly positive
solutions r1, r2 such that F1(r1) ≤ 0. Since F1(r1) ≤ 0 if and only if F2(r2) ≥ 0,
r1∆ ≤ eβ˜1∆ − 1, and r2∆ ≥ eβ˜2∆ − 1, we have that
1 + λ
1− λ ≥
r2
r1
≥ e
β˜2∆ − 1
eβ˜1∆ − 1 ,
as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. By Theorem 2.2 and Definition 2.3, we must solve (6.3) and
(6.4) for the equilibrium shadow interest rates. Proposition 6.1 provides us with the
existence and uniqueness of positive shadow interest rates, as desired.
The agents choose not to trade in Case 1, and the market interest rate cannot
be uniquely determined. The annuity values A consistent with this equilibrium must
satisfy
A ∈
[
A1
1 + λ
,
A1
1− λ
]
∩
[
A2
1 + λ
,
A2
1− λ
]
=
[
max(A1, A2)
1 + λ
,
min(A1, A2)
1− λ
]
.
Since Ai =
∆
eβ˜i∆−1
for i = 1, 2, we can rewrite the above interval as
A ∈

 ∆
(1 + λ)
(
emin(β˜1,β˜2)∆ − 1
) , ∆
(1− λ)
(
emax(β˜1,β˜2)∆ − 1
)

 .
This interval is nonempty by (2.5). Since A = 1/r, we have that
r ∈
[
1− λ
∆
(
emax(β˜1,β˜2)∆ − 1
)
,
1 + λ
∆
(
emin(β˜1,β˜2)∆ − 1
)]
6= ∅.
Trading occurs in Case 2, in which case we are able to determine a unique market
interest rate. When
eβ˜2∆ − 1
eβ˜1∆ − 1 >
1 + λ
1− λ,
we have that r2 =
1+λ
1−λ · r1 while r1 > 0 solves (6.6). In this case, 1/r1 = A1 =
A(1 + λ) = (1 + λ)/r, which implies that r = (1 + λ)r1. Similarly, r = (1 − λ)r2.
Therefore, the market interest rate r > 0 is determined by(
1 +
r∆
1− λ
) 1
α2∆
(
1 +
r∆
1 + λ
) 1
α1∆
= e
(
β˜1
α1
+
β˜2
α2
)
,
and the shadow interest rates are given in terms of
r = r1(1 + λ) = r2(1− λ).
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In continuous time, the proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 mirror their discrete-time
counterparts. The continuous-time analog of Fi defined in (6.2) is given for i = 1, 2 by
Fi(r) :=
1
αi
(
1− β˜i
r
)
, r > 0.
We now prove Theorem 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Since β˜2/β˜1 >
1+λ
1−λ , Theorem 3.4 shows that trade occurs for
∆ = 0 and r(0) is given uniquely by (3.6). Moreover,
eβ˜2∆ − 1
eβ˜1∆ − 1 −→
β˜2
β˜1
as ∆→ 0,
which by Theorem 2.4 implies that trade occurs for sufficiently small ∆ > 0. In this
case, r(∆) > 0 is given uniquely by the solution to (2.7).
For (∆, r) ∈ [0,∞)× (0,∞), we define
G(∆, r) :=


(
1 + r∆1+λ
) 1
α1∆
(
1 + r∆1−λ
) 1
α2∆ , for ∆ > 0
exp
(
r
(
1
α1(1+λ)
+ 1α2(1−λ)
))
, for ∆ = 0.
For sufficiently small ∆ > 0 and ∆ = 0, r(∆) is chosen such that G(∆, r(∆)) =
exp
(
β˜1
α1
+ β˜2α2
)
. Since G is smooth on [0,∞)× (0,∞) and ∂G∂r (0, r(0)) 6= 0 (a one-sided
derivative), the implicit function theorem implies that r(∆) −→ r(0) as ∆→ 0.
We now prove Corollary 4.1.
Proof. By Theorem 3.4, an equilibrium with trade will occur for λ ∈
[
0, β˜2−β˜1
β˜2+β˜1
)
, in
which agent 1 buys shares of the annuity, agent 2 sells shares of the annuity, and the
equilibrium interest rate is given by
r(λ) =
β˜1/α1 + β˜2/α2
1
α1(1+λ)
+ 1α2(1−λ)
.
Differentiating in λ, we see that r has local extrema at
λ− =
(√
α1 −√α2
)2
α2 − α1 and λ
+ =
(√
α1 +
√
α2
)2
α2 − α1 .
When α1 > α2, we have that both λ
−, λ+ < 0. In this case, r is strictly decreasing on[
0, β˜2−β˜1
β˜2+β˜1
)
. When α1 < α2, we have that λ
− ∈ (0, 1), λ+ > 1, r is strictly increasing
on
[
0,min
(
λ−, β˜2−β˜1
β˜2+β˜1
))
, and r is strictly decreasing on
(
min
(
λ−, β˜2−β˜1
β˜2+β˜1
)
, β˜2−β˜1
β˜2+β˜1
)
.
Recognizing that λˆ = λ− yields the desired result.
We next prove Proposition 4.5.
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Proof. The sum of the incomplete market certainty equivalents is differentiable on
[0, β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
). A calculation of the derivative yields
CE′1(λ) +CE
′
2(λ) =
−2(β˜2(1− λ)− β˜1(1 + λ))(α1(1 + λ)2 + α2(1− λ)2)
(α1(1 + λ) + α2(1− λ))(1 + λ)2(1− λ)2(β˜1α2 + β˜2α1)
.
Since β˜2(1−λ)−β˜1(1+λ) is strictly positive for λ ∈ [0, β˜2−β˜1β˜1+β˜2 ), we have that CE1+CE2
is strictly decreasing. On [ β˜2−β˜1
β˜1+β˜2
, 1], we have that CE1 + CE2 is constant.
We next verify that CE1(λ)+CE2(λ) < CE
comp
1 (γ)+CE
comp
2 (γ), and we recall that
the right hand side does not depend on γ. Since λ 7→ CE1(λ) +CE2(λ) is decreasing,
it suffices to check that the inequality holds for λ = 0.
By algebra, we have that CE1(λ) +CE2(λ) < CE
comp
1 (γ) +CE
comp
2 (γ) if and only
if rcomp > r(0), which in turn holds if and only if
α1
α2
σ21 +
α2
α1
σ22 − 2ρσ1σ2 > 0.
When σ1σ2 ≥ 0, this inequality holds since
α1
α2
σ21 +
α2
α1
σ22 − 2ρσ1σ2 ≥
α1
α2
σ21 +
α2
α1
σ22 − 2σ1σ2 =
(√
α1
α2
σ1 −
√
α2
α1
σ2
)2
> 0.
The case when σ1σ2 < 0 is handled analogously.
Finally, we show Theorem 5.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Assume that r1, r2 are strictly positive constants. By modifying
(6.1) to account for a traded bank account, we arrive at the same form of Fi as in (6.2).
By Definition 5.1 (iii), r1 and r2 must satisfy (6.3) and(
1 + r1
1 + r2
)n
∈
[
1− λ
1 + λ
,
1 + λ
1− λ
]
, for n ≥ 0,
while for each n ≥ 0, B1tn = B2tn · 1+λ1−λ if θˆ1tn − θˆ1tn−1 > 0, and B1tn = B2tn · 1−λ1+λ
if θˆ1tn − θˆ1tn−1 < 0. Since λ 6= 0, we must have that r1 = r2 and θˆ1tn − θˆ1tn−1 =
θˆ2tn − θˆ2tn−1 = 0 for all n ≥ 1. Moreover, (6.3) implies that F1(r1) = F2(r2) = 0, and
thus
log(1 + r1∆) = β˜1∆ = β˜2∆ = log(1 + r2∆),
as desired.
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